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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent decision of Austin J in Boral Formwork v Action Makers1 highlights significant 
statutory inroads into the autonomy principle, as it applies to bank guarantees and unconditional 
performance bonds.  To explore whether these instruments should continue to be accepted in 
lieu of cash retentions, this paper examines the autonomy principle and its exceptions (both 
common law and statutory).  The conclusion reached is that the uncertain, and potentially 
broadening, operation of both the common law and statutory exceptions to the autonomy 
principle may significantly curtail the use of bank guarantees and unconditional performance 
bonds as cash equivalents.  For a bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond to 
function as a risk allocation device (as well as a security), an intended beneficiary will need to 
routinely implement certain safeguards.  Placing blind faith in the autonomy principle will no 
longer suffice. 
                         
1  [2003] NSWSC 713. 
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AS GOOD AS CASH? 
THE DIMINUTION OF THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
 
Bill Dixon* 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority2 Stephen J observed (in relation to performance 
guarantees): 
 
"Once a document of this character ceases to be the equivalent of a cash 
payment, being instantly and unconditionally convertible to cash, it necessarily 
loses acceptability.  Only so long as it is ‘as good as cash’ can it fulfil its useful 
purpose of affording to those to whom it is issued the advantages of cash while 
involving for those who procure its issue neither the loss of use of an equivalent 
money sum nor the interest charges which would be incurred if such a sum were 
to be borrowed for the purpose.  Being ‘as good as cash’ in the eyes of those to 
whom it is issued is essential to its function”.3 
 
The issue of whether a performance guarantee was the functional equivalent of cash arose for 
consideration in Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd4 (‘Olex Focas’).  In this well-known 
decision, Batt J was required to consider the conduct of a beneficiary in attempting to call up (in 
full) guarantees that secured mobilisation/procurement advances which had been substantially 
repaid.  Batt J held that this conduct, where a partial call only was available, was 
unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law and proscribed by s 51 AA of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  In reaching this conclusion, Batt J made the observation that the 
                         
*  B Econ, LLB (Hons) (Qld), LLM (QUT); Solicitor, Queensland; Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
Queensland University of Technology.  I am grateful for the insights of an anonymous referee. 
2  (1979) 141 CLR 443.  In Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713 it was judicially 
recognised ([37]) that Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443 remains the 
leading statement of the autonomy principle in Australian law. 
3  Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443, 457. 
4  [1998] 3 VR 380. 
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effect of the statutory provision worked ‘a substantial inroad into the well-established common 
law autonomy of letters of credit and performance bonds and other bank guarantees’.5 
 
Justice Batt’s decision attracted considerable controversy and promoted substantial academic 
debate.6  One commentator suggested the need for statutory amendment so that the autonomy 
principle should not be imperilled.7  However, despite pleas to the contrary,8 the approach 
adopted by Batt J in Olex Focas9 has recently received the tacit approval of the New South 
Wales Supreme Court (Austin J) in Boral Formwork v Action Makers.10 
 
Given this development it is timely to examine the autonomy principle, and the full extent and 
operation of all exceptions (both common law and statutory), in its application to bank 
guarantees and unconditional performance bonds.  To the extent that there has been a 
diminution in the autonomy principle, such that instruments of this ilk may no longer be 
considered the functional equivalent of cash, the paper will examine the implications for 
beneficiaries. 
 
2.  AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
 
Bank guarantees and unconditional performance bonds are historically relatively new 
creatures.11  The autonomy principle was first associated with a commercial instrument of 
significantly longer duration, the letter of credit or documentary credit,12 and the principle must 
first be examined in this context. 
                         
5  Olex Focas [1998] 3 VR 380, 404. 
6  For example: R Baxt, ‘A Bombshell on Unconscionable Conduct’ (1997) 25 ABLR 227; R Baxt, 
‘Unconscionable Conduct under Trade Practices Act ‘(1997) 71 ALJ 432; R Baxt, 
‘Unconscionability Taken One Step Too Far?’ (1997) 25 ABLR 301; Ross P Buckley, 
‘Unconscionability Amok, or Two Readily Distinguishable Cases?’ (1998) 26 ABLR 323; Ross P 
Buckley, ‘Sections 51 AA and 51 AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: The Need for Reform’ 
(2000) 8 TPLJ 5. 
7  Ross P Buckley, ‘Sections 51 AA and 51 AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: The Need for 
Reform’ (2000) 8 TPLJ 5. 
8  Ross P Buckley, ‘Unconscionability Amok, or Two Readily Distinguishable Cases?’ (1998) 26 
ABLR 323, 326; Ross P Buckley, ‘Sections 51 AA and 51 AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: 
The Need for Reform’ (2000) 8 TPLJ 5, 9-10. 
9  [1998] 3 VR 380. 
10  [2003] NSWSC 713. 
11  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [32].  In Edward Owen Engineering v 
Barclays Bank International [1978] QB 159, Lord Denning described a performance bond as 
being a new creature as far as the courts were concerned (164). 
12  An outline of the history of the autonomy principle is provided by Young J in Hortico (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 545. 
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2.1  Letters of credit  
 
Under a letter of credit arrangement the issuing bank makes a commitment, on behalf of the 
account party, to pay a certain sum to the beneficiary, provided documents are presented which 
strictly comply with the terms of the credit.13  The promise that is made by the issuing bank 
under the letter of credit is to the beneficiary.  This is a separate contract under which the 
issuing bank is to pay provided the beneficiary can provide those documents required under the 
terms of the credit.  In addition to the contract between the account party and the beneficiary 
(‘the underlying contract’) and the contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary there is 
usually at least one further contract, namely that between the issuing bank and the account 
party. 
 
The independence of the contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary and the 
underlying contract is described as the ‘autonomy principle’.  The operation of this principle has 
been repeatedly confirmed.14  Due to the autonomy principle, provided the beneficiary presents 
documents which comply with the credit, the beneficiary will be paid regardless of whether or 
not the actual goods in question conform with the terms of the underlying contract15 and 
regardless of any dispute under the underlying contract.16  It is this independence from the 
performance of the underlying contract which gives documentary letters of credit ‘their 
international commercial utility and efficacy’.17   
 
Part of the attraction of the operation of the letter of credit, from a beneficiary's viewpoint, is the 
primary obligation owed by the issuing bank.  Considerations of set-off and counterclaim will not 
often arise and these instruments are unlikely to be nullified by attachment orders.18  Due to the 
                         
13  The arrangement ‘reallocates the risks of litigation, insolvency and dishonesty’ under the 
underlying contract between the account party and the beneficiary: M Shaw, ‘Enjoining Payment 
under a Letter of Credit - a Nominal Response? An Anglo American Perspective’, 1990, Vol 1, 
MFLP, 251,253. 
14  For example: Urquhart Lindsay & Co Ltd v Eastern Bank Ltd [1922] 1 KB 318; Hamzehi Malas & 
Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127. 
15  The rule being that the banks concerned deal in documents and not in goods: Montrod Ltd v 
Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH [2002] 3 ALL ER 697, [37]. 
16  The operation of the autonomy principle was clearly brought into focus as a result of the Islamic 
revolution in 1978 in Iran, when, for political reasons, demands were being made under letters of 
credit and first demand bonds by Iranian beneficiaries.  These demands were allegedly 
fraudulent, being made for reasons unrelated to default in the underlying contract. 
17  Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear Ltd 36 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 166. 
18  Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 3 ALL ER 607. 
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international reliance placed upon commercial documentary credits, the practice relating to 
these instruments has been subject to a body of rules formulated by the International Chamber 
of Commerce (‘ICC’).  ‘The Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits 
(‘UCP’) is an attempt to standardise the terms and conditions on which bankers will issue and 
act on commercial credits’.19  These UCP provisions are incorporated by reference into virtually 
every documentary letter of credit.  While the provisions are not themselves law, they are 
nevertheless binding on the parties as contractual terms.  The autonomy principle is well 
enshrined by the UCP provisions.20  
 
To a large extent the operation of the autonomy principle means that from a beneficiary's 
viewpoint, such instruments are the equivalent of cash in hand.  This is important given the 
reliance21 placed on such letters of credit.22  As well as being ‘regarded by merchants the world 
over as equivalent to cash’23 the autonomy principle is also of relevance to the issuing bank or 
financier.  Banks who charge a service for the provision of such facilities did not wish to be 
drawn into disputes arising from the performance or otherwise of the underlying contract.24  
Financiers must consider their reputation. As noted in Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank PLC:25 
 
                         
19  A L Tyree, Banking Law in Australia, 3rd ed, Butterworths, Chatswood, 1998, 386. 
20  Articles 3, 4 and 13(c) Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits (UCP 
500).  (A new version (UCP 600) of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial 
Documentary Credits is expected to be released by autumn 2005 according to an interview with a 
member of the relevant drafting group of the International Chamber of Commerce: 
http://www.iccbooks.com/frame_dciart4.asp).  UCP 500 also applies to standby letters of credit.  
As noted by Everett and McCracken, although the ICC adopted the International Standby 
Practice Rules (ISP 98) and endorsed the United Nations Convention on Independent 
Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit in 1999, anecdotal evidence suggests that Australian 
parties continue to have their standby letters of credit governed by UCP 500: S McCracken and A 
Everett, Banking & Financial Institutions Law, 6th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2004, 490-491.  The 
autonomy principle is accorded similar recognition in the Uniform Commercial Code. 
21  These instruments have been described as the ‘crankshaft of modern commerce’: Chorley, Law 
of Banking, 6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 225 as referred to by A L Tyree, above n19, 482. 
22  In Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corporation (The “Bhoja Trader”) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 256, such 
instruments were described as the lifeblood of commerce.  In Discount Records Ltd v Barclays 
Bank Ltd [1975] 1 ALL ER 1071 Megarry J said that banker's credits should only be interfered 
with in ‘grave’ circumstances as there was a need to maintain commercial confidence.  It was 
these considerations of commercial confidence and commercial certainty that lead the House of 
Lords to observe in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 
AC 168 that the autonomy of the documentary credit was its raison d’etre [183]. 
23  Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 3 ALL ER 607, 614. 
24  Further, as a party to a separate contract, independent of the underlying contract, the issuing 
bank is not usually in a position to have time to consider and is not obliged to make enquiries in 
relation to matters which may arise under the underlying contract. 
25  [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 171. 
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"The reputation of Barclays depends on strict compliance with its obligations ... the 
machinery of irrevocable obligations assumed by banks is essential to international 
commerce. Unless such commitments by banks can be honoured, trust in international 
commerce could be irreparably damaged".26 
 
The autonomy principle allows financiers to meet their obligations promptly so as to ensure that 
there is no effect on their ‘reputation for financial and contractual probity’.27   
 
The operation of the autonomy principle must be further examined in relation to bank 
guarantees and unconditional performance bonds. 
 
2.2  BANK GUARANTEES AND UNCONDITIONAL PERFORMANCE BONDS 
 
The essential parties to a bank guarantee or an unconditional performance bond are the same 
as the parties to a letter of credit transaction, namely the ‘issuing bank’ (or ‘issuer’), the ‘account 
party’ and the ‘beneficiary’.  Before considering these instruments themselves further, it is 
necessary to briefly examine certain terminology. 
 
Standby letters of credit, unconditional performance bonds, bank guarantees, banker's 
undertakings and independent or first demand guarantees are terms that are commonly 
intermingled.  Although differently described, these terms commonly describe the same type of 
obligation serving the same commercial purpose.28  The differences of form can largely be 
ascribed to the different jurisdictional nexus.  Standby letters of credit are essentially the 
American equivalent of a performance guarantee.29  A standby letter of credit differs from a 
traditional documentary credit in that a traditional letter of credit ‘is intended to secure payment 
to the beneficiary in respect of his performance of the underlying contract, whereas the latter 
[standby credit] is intended to secure the beneficiary against non performance by the 
                         
26  Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank PLC [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 171, 214. 
27  Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 Lloyds’ Rep 251, 257. 
28  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [36]. 
29  Standby letters of credit originated in the United States in the 1940’s.  At that time, United States’ 
banks were forbidden from issuing third party guarantees.  The banks overcame this restriction by 
the adaptation of the traditional letter of credit to function as the equivalent of a performance 
guarantee: S McCracken and A Everett, Banking & Financial Institutions Law, 6th ed, Lawbook 
Co, Sydney, 2004, 477-478.   See, also, M Coleman, ‘Performance Guarantees’, Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly (1990), 223, 225. 
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applicant’.30  Whilst standby letters of credit are a by product of the American system, 
performance bonds are essentially a product of the English legal system.31  Bank guarantees 
and banker's undertakings are, in turn, a product of the European system.  These documents 
are traditionally not under seal. 
 
This paper will focus on bank guarantees and those types of performance bonds which have 
been described as ‘unconditional’ or ‘first demand’ bonds.  The distinction is important, as 
performance bonds, in particular, are available in many varieties and hybrids.32  Having said 
this, bank guarantees or unconditional performance bonds will be the instruments most 
commonly sought by intended beneficiaries.33  Whilst an unconditional or first demand 
guarantee or bond traditionally is called for by the terms of an underlying contract, the 
guarantee or bond itself typically does not make reference to the underlying contract and 
certainly, from a beneficiary's viewpoint, does not seek to incorporate its terms by reference.34 
 
For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that a payment obligation is triggered by a simple 
demand by the beneficiary.35  As such these unconditional documents are commonly used and 
represent an instrument which is ‘readily, promptly and assuredly realisable’.36  The utilisation 
and purpose of these documents is very similar to the utilisation and purpose of documentary 
letters of credit as previously discussed.  These documents are commonly used for trade and 
project finance, in building or construction contracts, in property transactions (in lieu of deposits) 
and as security for service contracts.  Some of the advantages of these documents were 
                         
30  Paget's Law of Banking, 10th ed, Butterworths, London, 620. 
31  As English lawyers remain ‘burdened with the problems of the doctrine of consideration’ (C M 
Chinkin, P J Davidson, and W J M Riquier (Eds), Current Problems of International Trade 
Financing, Malaya Law Review and Butterworth & Co, Singapore, 1983, 267) a bond, taking the 
form of a deed, overcomes these issues. 
32  As observed in IE Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank PLC and Rafidain Bank [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
205 ‘it is important to determine whether the bond is payable on first simple demand or on first 
demand in a specified form, or on first demand supported by a specified document.’ (207) 
33  As the commercial function of these instruments is to protect the beneficiary from carrying credit 
risk during the course of a dispute with the account party as to money due under the underlying 
contract: Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [36]. 
34  In this context the term ‘guarantee’ is a misnomer: Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority (1979) 
141 CLR 443, 445 (Barwick CJ) (Similarly, Young J in Hortico (Aust) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment 
Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 545, 550 and Callaway JA in Fletcher Construction Australia 
Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812, 826).  These instruments typically impose primary 
obligations expressed to be unconditional once a demand is made in accordance with the 
instrument: Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [35]. 
35  A considerable body of case law has developed in relation to ‘statement’ guarantees or 
‘conditional’ bonds that will not be considered within the scope of this paper. 
36  Siporex Trade SA v Banque Indosuez [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 146, 158. 
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identified by Stephen J in Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority37 in the passage quoted at the 
start of this paper; namely that they have the advantages of cash whilst not involving the loss of 
use of the actual cash sum, nor exposing the account party to the interest charges applicable if 
the sum referred to in the document were actually borrowed.  In addition to lowering costs for an 
account party, there are a number of advantages for a beneficiary.  The beneficiary knows that 
the unconditional bank guarantee or performance bond provides a means of immediate 
compensation without the need to go through arbitration, negotiation or litigation.  Further, being 
able to make demand on such a document may well provide the beneficiary with a strengthened 
position of negotiation.  Finally, to the extent that there is an element of the underlying contract 
price that may reflect the cost of the security, this will be reduced ‘because the bank is not 
required to expend time and resources in investigating the validity of a claim’.38 
 
In the considerable case law treatment of bank guarantees and unconditional performance 
bonds, these instruments have been equated with letters of credit.39  Although each individual 
instrument must be separately considered to decide its effect and blind categorisations should 
not be adopted,40 the observation is commonly made that such instruments are very similar to 
irrevocable letters of credit.41  Consistent with these observations, the autonomy principle is also 
regarded as being applicable to these types of documents42 such that there are again a number 
of separate contracts that arise.  Particularly, there is a separation of the issuing bank's contract 
to pay the beneficiary and the underlying contract.  Barwick CJ noted in Wood Hall Limited v 
Pipeline Authority:43 
 
“... there is no basis whatever upon which the unconditional nature of the Bank's promise 
to pay on demand can be qualified by reference to the terms of the contract between the 
contractor and the owner.  Equally, there is no basis on which the owner's unqualified 
                         
37  (1979) 141 CLR 443. 
38  M Coleman, above n 29, 230. 
39  Consistent with the observation made by Batt J in Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd 
[1998] 3 VR 380, 397. 
40  GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank (1986) 30 BLR 53. 
41  Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corporation (The ‘Bhoja Trader’) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 256; Edward 
Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 QB 159; Howe Richardson 
Scale Co Ltd v Polimex-Cekob & National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 161; R.D. 
Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146. 
42  A Ward and G McCormack, ‘Subrogation and Bankers’ Autonomous Undertakings’, (2000) LQR 
121,122ff; R Edwards, ‘On-demand Guarantees or Performance Bonds: Rotten at the Root’, 
(2002) 18 ABFLB 13 as referred to by Austin J in Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] 
NSWSC 713, [32]. 
43  (1979) 141 CLR 443. 
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right at any time to demand payment by the Bank can be qualified by reference to the 
terms or purpose of that contract.”44 
 
This decision was cited with approval by a Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in 
Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd45 as being authority 
for the principle that ‘unconditional promises of this kind by a bank are not to be qualified by 
reference to the underlying contract which led to the creation of the bank's instrument’.46  This 
conclusion is again consistent with a perceived and real commercial desirability for such 
instruments to be ‘as good as cash’.47 
 
Whilst the strict application of the autonomy principle promotes the objects of commercial utility 
and efficacy, as noted previously it does operate to reallocate the risk to the account party.  This 
risk is accentuated in cases of fraud.  While the account party may be left with an action under 
the underlying contract against the beneficiary,48 this action may be illusory or alternatively not 
capable of enforcement (particularly in relation to certain foreign beneficiaries).  The judiciary 
has had to face the difficult task of balancing the risk between the various parties concerned.49  
The operation of both common law and statutory exceptions to the autonomy principle are 
reflective of a judicial balancing exercise.  As will be demonstrated, the practical upshot of the 
operation of these exceptions is a diminution in the functionality of a bank guarantee or an 
unconditional performance bond as a cash equivalent. 
                         
44  Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443, 445. 
45  [1992] 2 QdR 54. 
46  Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54, 
57. 
47 This policy reason, underlying the court’s refusal to tamper with the unconditional nature of these 
instruments, was expressly recognised: Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna 
Insurance Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54, 57. 
48  Bache & Co (London) Ltd v Banque Vernes et Commerciale de Paris [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437 
49  Policy considerations must also be considered: Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH 
[2002] 3 ALL ER 697 [58]. 
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3. THE FRAUD EXCEPTION 
 
3.1  LETTERS OF CREDIT 
 
The fraud exception describes circumstances where, due to the operation of fraud, the 
autonomy principle must yield.50  In this paper, the fraud exception, as applying to letters of 
credit, will only be examined relatively briefly in order to provide the framework to consider 
whether this exception has application in relation to bank guarantees and unconditional 
performance bonds. 
 
The fraud exception may operate to enable an issuing bank to elect to not make payment under 
a documentary letter of credit or alternatively may enable an account party to seek to restrain 
the issuing bank making payment or to restrain the beneficiary from seeking payment.  The 
actual scope and availability of the fraud exception in practice turns on several questions and 
appears to be very much dependent upon the relevant jurisdiction. 
 
It seems to be accepted that the fraud exception, to the autonomy of documentary credits, was 
first recognised by American courts.51  The leading case is Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking 
Corporation.52 (‘Sztejn’).  There the fraud alleged was that the beneficiary seller shipped 
worthless material and rubbish rather those goods ordered.  Shientag J after referring to the 
principle of autonomy as being ‘necessary to preserve the efficiency of the letter of credit as an 
instrument for the financing of trade’53 went on to consider the situation where for the purposes 
of this case it had to be assumed that the seller intentionally failed to ship the required goods.  
Shientag J observed: 
 
"In such a situation, where the seller's fraud has been called to the bank's attention before 
the drafts and documents have been presented for payment, the principle of the 
                         
50  The basis for the fraud exception, at least as between the issuing bank and its customer, may 
well be an implied contractual term: Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Chartered 
Bank London Ltd[1999] 1 ALL ER 890, 914 (Rix J). 
51  An observation confirmed by Young J in Inflatable Toy Company Pty Ltd v State Bank of New 
South Wales (1994) 34 NSWLR 243, 249. 
52  (1941), 31 NY Supp 2d 631. 
53  Ibid 634. 
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independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended to 
protect the unscrupulous seller."54 
 
In other words, a fraudulent beneficiary should not be unjustly enriched.  A difficulty arising from 
this case is that it is not clear whether this was a case of false documents or rather a case of 
fraud in the underlying transaction.  This distinction will assume greater significance in 
subsequent discussions.  For present purposes the writer prefers the view that the case should 
be characterised as a case of fraud in the underlying transaction.55  Certainly, the general trend 
of subsequent American decisions (arising from the operation of the Uniform Commercial Code) 
seems to be that the fraud exception is not limited to fraud as it relates to payment documents 
but will apply in relation to fraud in the underlying commercial transaction.56  It is useful to briefly 
consider some other jurisdictional approaches. 
 
Canadian decisions also recognise the operation of the fraud exception.57  The Canadian 
approach has been to not confine the operation of the exception to cases of fraud in the 
tendered document but to include ‘fraud in the underlying transaction of such a character as to 
make the demand for payment under the credit a fraudulent one’.58  In the same context, it was 
observed that ‘the fraud exception to the autonomy of a documentary credit should extend to 
any act of the beneficiary of a credit the effect of which would be to permit the beneficiary to 
obtain the benefit of the credit as a result of fraud’.59 
 
                         
54  Id. 
55  A similar conclusion is drawn by J J Browne, ‘The Fraud Exception to Standby Letters of Credit in 
Australia: Does it Embrace Statutory Unconscionability?; (1999) 11 Bond LR 98, 103. 
56  G A Fellinger, ‘ Letters of Credit: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception’, (1990) Vol 1, 
JBFLP, 4, 15.  Buckley notes that the US courts have moved towards framing their tests for fraud 
in terms which do not necessarily exclude equitable fraud, looking more to the severity of the 
effect of the fraud on the transaction: Ross P Buckley, ‘Unconscionability Amok, or Two Readily 
Distinguishable Cases?’ (1998) 26 ABLR 323, 328.  Decisions cited by Buckley in support of this 
conclusion include: Dynamics Corp of America v Citizens and Southern Bank 356 F Supp 991 
(ND Ga 1973); Intraworld Industries Inc v Girard Trust Bank 336 A 2d 316, 324-325 (SC Pa 
1975); First Arlington National Bank v Stathis 413 NE 2d 1288, 1295 (Ill App Ct 1981). 
57  CDN Research and Developments Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia (1980) 18 CPC 62 (Ont HC); Rosen 
v Pullen (1981) 126 DLR (3d) 62 (Ont HC); Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear (1987) 36 
DLR (4th) 161 (SC) are indicative authority.  For further discussion of these Canadian decisions 
refer to: J J Browne, ‘The Fraud Exception to Standby Letters of Credit in Australia: Does it 
Embrace Statutory Unconscionability?; (1999) 11 Bond LR 98. 
58  Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear Ltd  (1987) 36 DLR (4th) 161 (SC), 176. 
59  Ibid, 177. 
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Contrary to the approach of the American and Canadian judiciary, English courts have adopted 
a fairly strict view of the fraud exception.60  The leading decision61 remains the House of Lords 
decision in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada.62  This case 
defines the parameters of the fraud exception in English courts.  In that case, a shipment of 
goods was made one day after the time specified in the letter of credit but the loading brokers, 
who were not associated with the beneficiary, fraudulently entered the earlier date on the bill of 
lading.  In a judgment given by Lord Diplock, with the concurrence of the other four Law Lords, it 
was held that the fraud exception did not extend to fraud to which the beneficiary was not a 
party.63  More importantly, although the House of Lords observed that ‘fraud unravels all’, the 
nature of the fraud in this case was a fraud in the tendered documents rather than fraud in the 
underlying transaction.  In taking such a strict view, the House of Lords was attaching 
paramount importance to the autonomy principle. 
 
This approach can be contrasted with the earlier approach of Lord Denning MR in Edward 
Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd64 where the fraud exception was 
characterised by Lord Denning MR as follows: 
 
“... the bank ought not to pay under the credit if it knows that the documents are forged or 
that the request for payment is made fraudulently in circumstances where there is no right 
to payment."65 (Underlining added). 
 
The second half of Lord Denning's formulation would seem to be wide enough to encompass 
the concept of fraud in the underlying transaction. 
 
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of Australian authority in relation to the operation of the fraud 
exception.  Whilst Sztejn,66 as accepted by the English Court of Appeal in Edward Owen 
                         
60  Beginning with Hamzeh Malas & Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127, other 
examples include Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 315, Themehelp Ltd v 
West [1995] 3 WLR 751; Solo Industries (UK) Ltd v Canara Bank [2001] 1 WLR 1800. 
61  An observation made in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH [2002] 3 ALL ER 697 
[44]. 
62  [1983] 1 AC 168. 
63  This proposition was recently affirmed in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH 
[2002] 3 ALL ER 697, where the Court of Appeal held that the fraud exception did not embrace a 
nullity exception based upon the concept of a document being fraudulent in itself or devoid of 
commercial value. 
64  [1978] QB 159. 
65  Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159, 169. 
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Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd,67 has been accepted as being the law in 
Australia,68 the parameters of the exception have not been clearly defined.  Particularly, the 
question remains open whether the fraud exception extends to fraud in the transaction rather 
than merely to fraud in the tendered documents.  Whilst there is a suggestion that the judgment 
of Young J. in Inflatable Toy Company Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales69 may have 
adopted a slightly wider test in relation to the fraud exception, as exemplified by the American 
and Canadian decisions, the question remains open whether the fraud exception extends to 
other cases of unconscionable conduct, or cases of non-performance of the underlying 
contract.70  Until such time as there is a decision by a higher appellate court or the High Court, 
there remains considerable uncertainty as to the actual operation of the fraud exception.  All that 
can be said with certainty at the present time is that the exception is recognised as being part of 
Australian law. 
 
3.1.1.  GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
As well as the bounds of the fraud exception differing, differing standards of proof seem to be 
applied in different jurisdictions71 and there are consequential differences as to the prospects of 
relief being obtained.  There are also differences in approach depending upon whether the 
issuing bank seeks to avoid payment or alternatively whether the account party seeks relief 
either against the issuing bank or the beneficiary. 
 
However, there are some unifying trends.  Generally it is unlikely that issuing banks will seek to 
avoid their payment obligations.72  In circumstances where banks may wish to dishonour their 
payment obligations, due to the operation of the fraud exception, they will require strong 
evidence.  It would seem the issuing bank, in these circumstances, would need to establish at 
least that the relevant facts are indicative of ‘fraud’ (as the term is understood in the individual 
jurisdiction) and the relevant fraud must be ‘established’ before the issuing bank may dishonour 
                                                                               
66  (1941) 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (S.C). 
67  [1978] 1 All ER 976. 
68  Contronic Distributors Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) v Bank of New South Wales 
[1984] 3 NSWLR 110, 116 (as subsequently affirmed in Inflatable Toy Company Pty Ltd v State 
Bank of New South Wales (1994) 34 NSWLR 243). 
69  (1994) 34 NSWLR 243. 
70  These issues were expressly left open by Young J in Inflatable Toy Company Pty Ltd v State 
Bank of New South Wales (1994) 34 NSWLR 243, 251. 
71  The English standard of clearly established fraud (Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays 
Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 976, 984) appears again to be most stringent. 
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its payment obligations.  In practical terms, these circumstances are unlikely to arise.  As noted 
previously, the issuing bank is regulated by a contract which is separate from the underlying 
contract and usually the bank has no duty of inquiry.73  Given that the bank has no duty of 
inquiry and generally wishes to preserve its reputation by making payment promptly, it is 
unlikely that fraud to the requisite standard of proof would be ‘established’ before the bank's 
payment obligation arose. 
 
Where the account party seeks relief, due to the operation of the fraud exception, different 
considerations will arise.  Again, in general terms, it can be observed that the possibility of relief 
is far greater where relief is sought against a beneficiary rather than the issuing bank.  This 
aspect will be considered in greater detail as it applies in relation to bank guarantees and 
unconditional performance bonds. 
 
3.2  BANK GUARANTEES AND UNCONDITIONAL PERFORMANCE BONDS 
 
The typical form of a bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond is such that the issuing 
bank's liability is triggered by a demand for payment, rather than the production of documents 
as is the case in a letter of credit transaction.  Undoubtedly, this produces a greater scope for 
abuse of these instruments and therefore greater possibilities of fraud.  Ackner L.J. refers, for 
instance, to the ‘many abuses of the performance bond procedure’.74  There is also a greater 
likelihood that these documents may be called up with a view to resolving a quite separate 
dispute that may have arisen between the contractual parties,75 to enhance a negotiating 
position (as part of a ‘strategy’ to seek to resolve a dispute)76 or for purely political reasons.77   
 
Given the possibilities for fraudulent abuse of these documents, it is necessary to consider the 
application of the ‘fraud exception’ in relation to the generally autonomous nature of these 
transactions.  Particularly, is the case law that has developed in relation to letters of credit 
                                                                               
72  Cf Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54. 
73  As noted by the Court of Appeal in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH [2002] 3 
ALL ER 697 it is not for a bank to make its own inquiries about allegations of fraud. [58]. 
74  Esal Commodities Ltd v Oriental Credit Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 546, 550. 
75  As with the ‘Billion Egg Contract’ in United Trading Corporation SA and Murray Clayton Ltd v 
Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 554. 
76  As in Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443. 
77  The judgment of the Court of Appeal in R D Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster 
Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146 highlights the risks for account parties of the unconditional wording 
associated with such documentation. 
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directly applicable to bank guarantees and unconditional performance bonds?  At the outset, it 
must be observed that the documentary letter of credit cases are less likely to be applicable78 
given an issuing bank's obligations under a documentary letter of credit to ensure that there is 
strict compliance in terms of documentation and the investigation made necessary by this 
requirement.  In bank guarantee and unconditional performance bond cases, there is less 
emphasis on ‘strict compliance’ and accordingly less scope for investigations by the issuing 
bank to discover or be aware of fraud.  There is a further potential impediment to the application 
of the ‘fraud exception’ to bank guarantees and unconditional performance bonds.  As 
previously mentioned, the approach of the House of Lords in United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada79 seems to limit the fraud exception in that 
jurisdiction to ‘fraud in the documents’ rather than ‘fraud in the underlying transaction’. 
 
As demand may be made under bank guarantees or unconditional performance bonds without 
the production of documents, the strict approach of the House of Lords may make the fraud 
exception of no application.  This approach is not without criticism.80  It may be argued that the 
flexible standard, as to what will fall within the fraud exception, advocated by Stephenson J in 
the Court of Appeal decision in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada81 is preferable.82  Consistent with the approach of Lord Denning MR in Edward Owen 
Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd,83 when applying the fraud exception to bank 
guarantees and unconditional performance bonds, it may be argued that it is sufficient if a 
request for payment is made fraudulently.  In other words, fraud sufficient to invoke the fraud 
exception should not be required to relate directly back to the documents ‘but may simply taint 
the demand made under the instrument’.84 
 
Notwithstanding the possibility that the House of Lords' decision in United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,85 if strictly followed, seems to leave no room for the 
application of the fraud exception in relation to unconditional performance bonds and bank 
                         
78  An observation made by J C Phillips and J O'Donovan, The Modern Contract of Guarantee, 3rd 
ed, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1996, 778. 
79  [1983] 1 AC 168. 
80  Fellinger suggests that a technical distinction between ‘fraud in the documents’ and ‘fraud in the 
underlying transaction’ is specious: G A Fellinger, above n 56, 23. 
81  [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 604. 
82  A flexible standard could accommodate the American/Canadian approach where the fraud 
exception is generally accepted to be wider in its operation. 
83  [1978] 1 QB 159. 
84  G A Fellinger, above n 56, 18. 
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guarantees, subsequent English and Australian cases recognise the possibility of a fraud 
exception arising in relation to these documents.86  Inconsistent approaches to the standard of 
proof87 and discretionary considerations associated with the grant of equitable relief88 mean that 
the bounds of the fraud exception in Australian jurisdictions have not been clearly delineated.  
The only thing that can be said with certainty is that if common law fraud is established, to the 
appropriate standard of proof,89 then relief may be available.  Will anything else, apart from 
common law fraud, invoke the operation of the fraud exception? 
 
In the English and Australian jurisdictions, contrary to the American and Canadian approach, 
there seems to have been a reluctance to widen the theoretical bounds of the fraud exception.  
However there have been statements made at various times to indicate that the exception may 
not be theoretically limited to common law fraud.  In an early English decision, Elian & Rabbath 
v Matsas & Matsas,90 the Court of Appeal, in what it regarded as being a special case, granted 
an injunction to prevent what might be irretrievable injustice. The result in this case was perhaps 
legally justified due to a total failure of consideration and/or the invalidity of the underlying 
contract. 
 
In Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Australia) Pty Ltd,91 arguments based on 
equitable, rather than common law, fraud were raised as justifying the application of the fraud 
exception.  Although the equitable concept of ‘fraud of a power’ was not considered to invoke 
                                                                               
85  [1983] 1 AC 168. 
86  Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman Contractors Ltd (1984) 28 BLR 19; United Trading Corporation SA 
& Murray Clayton Ltd v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554; GKN Contractors Ltd v 
Lloyd's Bank (1986) 30 BLR 53; Washington Constructions Company Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking 
Corporation [1983] 1 Qd R 179; Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Australia) Pty 
Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 545; NEI Pacific Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia, Ltd (Unreported, NSWSC, 
Mowlem J, 29 August 1991); Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance 
Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54. 
87  It has been judicially noted that English interlocutory injunction decisions must be approached 
with a degree of caution concerning the standard of proof for fraud: Fletcher Construction 
Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812, 830 (Callaway JA). 
88  Together with the absence of a High Court authority. 
89  The generally accepted view in Australia being that the standard of proof for fraud at trial is proof 
on the balance of probabilities taking into account the nature and seriousness of the allegation: 
Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 179 referred to in Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v 
Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812, 830. 
90  [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 495. 
91  (1985) 1 NSWLR 545. 
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the exception,92 Young J indicated that equitable relief could be given where there was either 
fraud or gross unconscionable conduct.93  In Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Telede Pty Ltd,94 the 
possibility of relief was mooted where a claim for payment was made which could be regarded 
as specious or fanciful or far fetched.  In GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank,95 it was 
suggested that the ambit of the fraud exception might be extended to a case where the demand 
did not tally with the terms of the document itself in that it was made by a beneficiary not 
named.  Finally, by way of illustration, in Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman Contractors Ltd,96 
Eveleigh J suggested that there may be an exception, wider than the fraud exception, operative 
if there was a total failure of consideration in the underlying contract or if this contract was 
avoided.  These decisions simply serve to illustrate that the scope of the fraud exception is by 
no means clearly delineated and may potentially be broader than previously recognised. 
 
3.2.1  INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 
Where it is alleged that a beneficiary has committed fraud an account party will seek court 
assistance.  The assistance sought would usually be in the form of an injunction or other 
equitable relief discretionary in nature.97  One of the more instructive cases in relation to the 
type of equitable considerations that apply is Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co. 
(Australia) Pty Ltd.98  Young J stressed that in the exercise of discretion as to the grant of 
equitable relief, the Court must have regard to the commercial character, and exigencies, of the 
transaction, noting that: 
 
                         
92  Young J noted that although equity may intervene where there is an unconscionable use of a 
contractual (or statutory) power for an improper purpose, (Logue v Shoalhaven Shire Council 
[1979] 1 NSWLR 537, 553-554), the exercise of this discretionary power was not warranted given 
the commercial nature of the transaction. 
93  By way of contrast, Batt J had grave reservations concerning whether gross unconscionability, 
falling short of actual fraud, would be grounds for an injunction: Olex Focas [1998] 3 VR 380, 400. 
94  (1989) 8 ACLR 22. 
95  (1986) 30 BLR 53. 
96  (1984) 28 BLR 19, 28-29. 
97  It is trite law that the grant of an injunction will require the applicant to establish both that there is 
a serious issue to be tried and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction.  
However, in the context of the fraud exception it is noted by Paget that ‘ the circumstances in 
which both propositions can be established will be exceedingly rare.’  Paget, in turn, refers to 
numerous reported instances where applications for injunctions have failed: Paget, above n 30, 
651. 
98  [1985] 1 NSWLR 545. 
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"there is a time to interfere in commercial activities, but that more often than not, 
commercial life is better served by a ‘hands off’ policy on behalf of the courts".99 
 
Young J cautioned against the Court readily interfering in dealings between ‘experienced 
commercial men’.100  Young J went on to note that ‘equitable doctrines which were invented to 
protect the gullible and uneducated from predators are not necessarily to be applied in 
transactions between merchants or members of the commercial community in their ordinary 
trading’.101  In this regard, the potential insolvency of the beneficiary of the bank guarantee or 
unconditional performance bond was irrelevant. 
 
A court will be reluctant to grant equitable relief unless it can be shown that without relief being 
provided that there will be irreparable damage for which damages would not represent adequate 
compensation.102  Also where a beneficiary is based overseas a Court may be unwilling to grant 
an injunction where the question of foreign enforcement arises.103  A further issue that arises is 
the requisite standard of proof to establish fraud.  Once again, there is no uniformity of approach 
in relation to the standard of proof required.  Fellinger refers to the need for ‘obvious fraud’ or 
‘clear fraud’.104  Earlier cases, particularly English cases, have once again adopted a fairly 
rigorous test, namely the requirement for clearly established fraud or circumstances where ‘the 
only realistic inference to draw is that of fraud’.105  A slightly different later English formulation in 
GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank106 was that the test should be whether fraud was the only 
reasonable inference to be drawn in the circumstances.107 
 
Once again, although there may be different jurisdictional approaches, there are certain similar 
trends.  An uncorroborated statement of the account party alleging fraud will not constitute 
                         
99  Ibid 553. 
100  Id. 
101  [1985] 1 NSWLR 545, 553-554. 
102  GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank (1986) 30 BLR 53. 
103  United Trading Corporation SA & Murray Clayton Ltd v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
554. 
104  G A Fellinger, above n 56, 17. 
105  United Trading Corporation SA & Murray Clayton Ltd v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
554,561. 
106  (1986) 30 BLR 53. 
107  Once again, American and Canadian decisions seem to have adopted a less onerous standard, 
namely a ‘strong prima facie case’ of fraud, particularly with respect to applications for 
interlocutory injunctions. 
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sufficient evidence for the fraud exception to apply.108  A mere failure by a beneficiary, 
particularly a foreign beneficiary, to answer an allegation of fraud will not necessarily be enough 
for an adverse inference to be drawn to enable the fraud exception to be established. Despite 
this, it seems that an opportunity must be given to the beneficiary to answer fraud allegations. 
 
The suggestion has been made (in relation to letters of credit) that there may be a variable 
approach depending upon who it is that is seeking to apply the fraud exception.  More 
particularly, Fellinger suggests that should the issuing bank dishonour its obligations on the 
basis of an alleged or perceived fraud in the absence of a court injunction (known as ‘elective 
dishonour’-see 3.2.1.1 below), this may involve a higher standard of proof than injunctive 
dishonour cases where wider considerations and different standards of proof may apply to 
determine whether there is fraud in the ‘transaction as a whole’.109  These comments would 
appear equally applicable to cases involving bank guarantees and unconditional performance 
bonds.  In the absence of a High Court determination, the differing standards of proof and 
different jurisdictional approaches make the availability of injunctive relief uncertain.  The 
different types of relief and differing circumstances in which relief may be sought are further 
considered in 3.2.1.1 to 3.2.1.3 inclusive. 
 
3.2.1.1 Mandatory injunction or declaration or other relief sought by a beneficiary to get 
an issuing bank to pay when the issuing bank is trying to resist payment (on the 
grounds of fraud) 
 
Due to the operation of the autonomy principle, coupled with the desire of an issuing bank to 
preserve its own reputation, cases of this type have been relatively rare until recent times.  
Often characterised as ‘elective dishonour’ cases, commentators have suggested that issuing 
banks should not be encouraged to resist payment.110  A situation like this arose in Burleigh 
Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd111 where the issuer of 
unconditional bonds sought to refuse to pay by asserting that the beneficiary's right to payment 
was qualified by the provisions of the building contract which the bonds in question secured. 
                         
108  Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 ALL ER 976; Washington 
Constructions Co Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [1983] 1 Qd R 179. 
109  G A Fellinger, above n 56, 22. 
110  ‘Fraud is a legal matter and, as such, issuing banks should not be permitted to make judgments 
on the evidence.’: G A Fellinger, above n 56, 22. 
111  [1992] 2 Qd R 54.  Similarly, NEI Pacific Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (Unreported, 
NSWSC, Mowlem J, 29 August 1991). 
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This argument was rejected by the Full Court of the Queensland Supreme Court.  Applying the 
unanimous decision of the High Court in Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority112, it was held 
that the issuing bank had ‘the burden to pay, with no burden of enquiry, or duty to third 
parties’.113  
 
Without the clearest possible evidence of fraud, which in the absence of a duty to inquire the 
issuing bank is not likely to have, it is likely that an action for a mandatory injunction or 
declaration or other relief to require payment by an issuing bank would have reasonable 
prospects of success. 
 
3.2.1.2 Injunction sought by an account party seeking to restrain an issuing bank making 
payment to a beneficiary 
 
An action of this type would generally have extremely limited prospects of success.  ‘The wholly 
exceptional case where an injunction may be granted is where it is proved that the bank knows 
that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be 
fraudulent.  But the evidence must be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank’s 
knowledge’.114 (Underlining added)  Given that the issuing bank will usually have no documents 
to examine and is under no duty to make enquiries it will be very difficult in practice for this 
evidential standard of proof as to fraud to be satisfied.  There have been innumerable cases 
where such injunctions have been sought without success.115  Apart from the almost 
insurmountable problems of proof that will arise in seeking such injunctions against the issuing 
bank, a further problem was identified in R.D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster 
Bank Ltd.116 The issuing bank only has two options; it can pay or it can refuse to pay.  If the 
bank pays when it should have paid, no complaint can be made.  If the bank pays when it 
should not have paid, due to fraud, then the account party may pursue a remedy in damages 
against the bank117 or against the beneficiary.  In these circumstances, the balance of 
convenience does not favour the issue of an injunction.118 
                         
112  (1979) 141 CLR 443. 
113  Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54, 
60. 
114  Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 All ER 351. 
115  In Washington Constructions Company Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1983] Qd R 179, 
Thomas J described such a claim against the issing bank as being ‘misconceived’. [180]. 
116  [1978] QB 146. 
117  A theoretical possibility referred to by Kerr J in R D Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155.  In practical terms, in the absence of clear evidence 
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3.2.1.3 Injunction (mandatory or otherwise) against a beneficiary to withdraw a demand 
or to stop a future demand 
 
This type of action may have some prospects of success and is separately considered as the 
second recognised exception to the autonomy principle. 
 
4.  THE SECOND EXCEPTION TO THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
 
4.1  RESTRICTIONS ARISING FROM THE TERMS OF THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT119 
 
Even though the terms of the bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond appear to be 
‘unconditional’,120 it is open for the account party to allege121 that the terms of the underlying 
contract regulate the circumstances under which the beneficiary is entitled to demand payment 
under the bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond.  Typically, the account party will 
seek an injunction to restrain the breach, by the beneficiary, of an express, implicit or implied122 
negative stipulation in the underlying contract.  The account party will allege that the effect of 
the stipulation is that the beneficiary may not call upon the instrument where a dispute exists 
between the account party and the beneficiary.123  While the court is not required to interfere 
                                                                               
both as to the fact of fraud and the bank’s knowledge, there would seem little prospect of 
successful reliance on a damages claim against the bank.  Further, the terms of a bank’s express 
contract with the account party would typically exclude the account party having any recourse to 
the bank for making payment in circumstances where a demand for payment had been made by 
a beneficiary. 
118  There can be no irretrievable injustice of the type contemplated in Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman 
Contractors Ltd (1984) 28 BLR 19. 
119  The operation of this exception to the autonomy principle has been the subject of a number of 
existing articles and is only considered briefly in this paper.  Reference may be made to the 
following: William Mark Jones, ‘Injunctions Restraining Contractor’s Bank Guarantees’, (1999) 15 
Building and Construction Law 229; The Honourable Justice David Byrne, ‘Rights of the Grantor 
under a Performance Bond’, (2001) Building and Construction Law 4. 
120  Contractual terms will not readily be implied in bank guarantees or unconditional performance 
bonds: Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443, 451; BI (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cigna 
Insurance Australia Ltd (1990) 11 BCL 64. 
121  The account party will bear the onus of proof: ADI Ltd v State Electricity Commission of Victoria 
(Unreported, Vic Sup Ct, Brooking J, 12 August 1997). 
122  To adopt the language of Callaway JA in Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd 
[1998] 3 VR 812,826. 
123  The account party will frequently be concerned that any demand that is successfully made under 
a bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond will adversely affect their commercial 
reputation.  Refer, for example, to Pearson Bridge v State Rail Authority of New South Wales 
(1982) 1 ACLR 81, [20]; Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty 
Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 451, 461-462. 
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directly with financier’s autonomy, the beneficiary is precluded from invoking the financier’s 
autonomous obligation.124 
 
‘The origin of the mischief’125 arose from an obiter comment by Stephen J in Wood Hall Limited 
v Pipeline Authority.126  In that case, a submission that the Authority was in breach of its contract 
with the contractor, in making demand for payment before its entitlement to damages had been 
established, was rejected.  In doing so, His Honour said: 
 
"Had the construction contract itself contained some qualification upon the Authority's power to 
make a demand under a performance guarantee, the position might well have been different".127 
 
Although the contract in that case was silent on the point, it will be appreciated that most 
underlying contracts will not be silent.  Although English courts have been reluctant to grant 
injunctive relief of this type,128 this reluctance is not reflected in a substantial line of Australian 
authority where beneficiaries have been successfully enjoined in the absence of an entitlement 
under the underlying contract to make the demand for payment.129  Unfortunately, Australian 
authority is itself divided with a number of cases upholding a beneficiary’s recourse to a security 
provided the claimed entitlement was neither fanciful nor specious.130  The fact that these two 
lines of Australian authority have been judicially recognised to be irreconcilable131 merely serves 
                         
124  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [40]. 
125  R Chesterman, 'Bank Guarantees, Performance Bonds and Other Unconditional Obligations’, 
CLE, Securities VI, 1992, 150, 173. 
126  (1979) 141 CLR 443. 
127  Wood Hall Limited v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443, 459. 
128  Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 251, 256-257; Group Josi Re v 
Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1152, 1161-1162. 
129  Pearson Bridge v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 1 ACLR 81; Tenore Pty Ltd v 
Roleystone Pty Ltd (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Giles J, 14 September 1990); Hughes Bros Pty 
Ltd v Telede Pty Ltd (1989) 7 BCL 210; Selvas Pty Ltd v Hanson Yuncken Pty Ltd and State Bank 
of Australia (1987) 6 ACLR 36; Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Simon Engineering (Australia) 
Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 451 and Reed Construction Services Pty Ltd v Kheng Seng (Australia) 
Pty Ltd (1999) 15 BCL 158 are illustrative of a strong line of authority. 
130  Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Telede Pty Ltd (1992) 7 BCL 210; Phillips Pty Ltd v Baulderstone 
Hornibrook Pty Ltd (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct,Giles J, 26 October 1994); Ultra Refurbishing and 
Construction Pty Ltd vJohn Goubran & Associates Pty Ltd (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 
24 April 1997); Coby Constructions Pty Ltd v Melbourne Glass Pty Ltd (Unreported, Vic Sup Ct, 
Gillard J, 7 April 1998) and Kennedy Taylor (Vic) Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd 
(2000) 16 BCL 374 are equally illustrative of a strong divergent line of authority (as referred to by 
The Honourable Justice David Byrne, ‘Rights of the Grantor under a Performance Bond’, (2001) 
Building and Construction Law 4,10). 
131  An observation made by Brooking JA in Bachmann Pty Ltd v BHP Power New Zealand Ltd [1999] 
VR 420. 
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to heighten the importance that will be attached to an individual construction of the particular 
contract132 between the account party and the beneficiary.133  Given the lack of any unifying 
trend in the numerous Australian decisions on this particular issue, it is perhaps not surprising 
that one commentator has suggested that an appropriate response to the question ‘Are 
performance bonds as good as money?’ may be: 
 
"Yes, if the judge says so, but it depends upon which judge is allocated to make the decision 
and on subtleties of language in the underlying contract and whether the judge thinks the 
beneficiary is acting unfairly.”134 
 
The one thing that is clear is that ‘the duty of the bank to pay and the right of a beneficiary to 
claim are not simply opposite sides of the same coin’135 and there may be reasonable prospects 
of an account party being successful in this type of action.136  Further, ‘injunctive dishonour’ 
cases of this type are not usually associated with the exacting standard of proof associated with 
elective dishonour cases leading to a greater likelihood of curial relief.  In combination with the 
inherent uncertainty associated with judicial interpretation of individual contracts in 
circumstances of clearly divergent lines of authority, these factors alone indicate that any 
equation, by beneficiaries, of a bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond with cash 
may be dangerous.  It remains now to examine the third exception to the autonomy principle. 
                         
132  In delivering judgment in Malaysia Hotel (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sabemo Pty Ltd (1993) 11 BCL 50, 
Mahoney JA expressly restricted his decision to the particular contractual documents and the 
context in which they were made. 
133  The decisions are also reflective of the evolution of certain standard contractual provisions.  For a 
useful history of both this evolution and the particular importance that may be attached to 
contractual language (such as ‘may be entitled’, ‘shall be entitled’, or ‘becomes entitled’) refer to: 
The Honourable Justice David Byrne, ‘Rights of the Grantor under a Performance Bond’, (2001) 
Building and Construction Law 4.  By way of illustration only, the distinction between the words 
‘shall be entitled’ and ‘may be entitled’ were regarded as critical by Austin J in Reed Construction 
Services Pty Ltd v Kheng Seng (Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 15 BCL 158. 
134  R Chesterman, above n 125, 173, 179. 
135  M Coleman, above n 29, 224.  At a judicial level, a similar observation was made by Callaway JA 
in Fletcher Construction Ausralia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812, 826. 
136  Although at least one commentator is of the view that the prospects of being granted an injunction 
may diminish where the form of security involved is a standby letter of credit, on the basis that 
courts view applications for an injunction more critically in these circumstances: William Mark 
Jones, above n 119, 237. 
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5.  THE THIRD EXCEPTION TO THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
 
5.1  STATUTORY UNCONSCIONABILITY 
 
In the introductory comments reference was made to the controversy137 generated by the 
judgment of Batt J in Olex Focas138 and the potential impact of statutory unconscionability on 
the autonomy principle.  The full extent of the impact has recently been demonstrated in the 
judgment of Austin J in Boral Formwork v Action Makers.139  
 
Boral and Action Makers entered into an agreement under which Action Makers was to 
manufacture and deliver to Boral scaffolding equipment.  After inspecting certain equipment as 
delivered, Boral determined that the product was defective in that it did not meet the supply 
specifications.  Boral wrote a letter to Action Makers providing details of the defects and 
subsequently incurred expenditure in carrying out rectification work on the goods. 
 
Under the terms of its supply agreement, Action Makers was the beneficiary of an irrevocable 
standby letter of credit issued by the second defendant bank on behalf of its client, Boral.  
Administrative receivers were appointed to Action Makers.  The receivers, as agents for Action 
Makers, made a demand on the bank for payment of the sum representing the full amount of the 
invoices rendered by Action Makers for scaffolding equipment supplied.  The bank paid that part 
which Boral admitted to be owing (‘the undisputed amount’) but the balance of the amount 
claimed was alleged by Boral to be the cost of the rectification work (‘the disputed amount’), 
which Boral claimed to be entitled to deduct from the sum owing. 
 
The issue for determination by the court was whether Boral was entitled to prevent the Bank 
from meeting the receivers’ demand on the letter of credit for the disputed amount.  To succeed, 
Boral needed to overcome the operation of the autonomy principle.  Boral claimed to be entitled 
to relief on the basis of an implied negative stipulation in the supply agreement; or alternatively 
pursuant to s 51 AA or s 51 AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  Austin J was not 
                         
137  Prior to this decision, unconscionability was considered unlikely to arise in the commercial arena: 
R Baxt and J Mahemoff, ‘Unconscionable Conduct Under the Trade Practices Act-An Unfair 
Response by the Government: A Preliminary View’ (1998) 26 ABLR 5, 11. 
138  [1998] 3 VR 380. 
139  [2003] NSWSC 713. 
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persuaded that there was an implied negative stipulation in the underlying supply agreement 
such as to ground an entitlement to an injunction restraining a call being made under the 
standby letter of credit for the disputed amount.  Was Boral entitled to relief on the basis that 
Action Makers, by its administrative receivers, had engaged in unconscionable conduct for the 
purposes of s 51 AA or s 51 AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) when they made a call on 
the letter of credit for amounts more than due, for reasons known to the receivers, and certified 
incorrectly for that purpose? 
 
Austin J was satisfied that it would be appropriate to make declarations and orders under s 51 
AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  In addition, the specified conduct of the 
administrative receivers was held to be unconscionable within the words of s 51 AC of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  As to the presumption of autonomy, Austin J opined: 
 
“… the presumption of autonomy does not provide an adequate discretionary reason for 
declining declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of contravention of s 51 AC.  The position 
might have been different if this was simply a case of making a call on the irrevocable 
instruments to apply pressure to resolve the dispute.  But here, the dispute was effectively over 
and the Disputed Amount was no longer owing, and it was unconscionable for Action Makers to 
use its rights under the letter of credit by certifying for payment of the whole Invoice Amount in 
those circumstances.”140 
 
Having regard to the provisions of s 51 AA(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Austin J 
ultimately granted relief under s 51 AC, to the exclusion of s 51 AA.  In the result, Action Makers 
was required to countermand the demand for payment of the disputed amount under the letter 
of credit, and restrained from making any further demands under the instrument.141  While the 
judgment makes it clear that the autonomy principle does not override the statute,142 the 
principle has a clear role to play: 
 
“Even if the conduct is unconscionable, the principle of autonomy is relevant to the exercise of 
the Court’s discretion to grant injunctive relief or leave the plaintiff to other remedies.  Here the 
circumstances, involving as they do a call on the letter of credit on a false basis, are sufficiently 
                         
140  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [87]. 
141  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [91]. 
142  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [74]. 
 26
special to overcome the hesitation which the principle of autonomy generates.”143 (Underlining 
added) 
 
With great respect to Austin J, the description of circumstances as being ‘sufficiently special’ to 
justify interference with the autonomy principle seems to merely provide further ammunition for 
those who argue144 that statutory unconscionability should have no role to play in commercial 
transactions of this ilk.145  Apart from the general concern that ‘sand is not thrown in the wheels 
of commerce’,146 it would seem reasonable to suggest that the behaviour of the receivers in this 
particular instance was merely an example of the commercially driven morality that was 
impliedly sanctioned by the High Court in Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority.147  Undoubtedly, 
intended beneficiaries will have genuine concerns about the consistent future implementation of 
a judicial standard of ‘sufficiently special’ circumstances justifying interference with the 
autonomy principle.  Further, beneficiaries may be concerned that allegations of unconscionable 
conduct may be used as a bargaining chip by account parties in a post hoc attempt to reallocate 
risk. 
 
6.  PRACTICAL REMEDIES FOR BENEFICIARIES 
 
Beneficiaries have a legitimate concern to ensure that bank guarantees and unconditional 
performance bonds are as ‘good as cash’.  The advantages of these instruments, as compared 
to a usual guarantee, are clear.148  Although it is not possible to exclude the operation of the 
                         
143  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [94]. 
144  As referred to previously: R Baxt, ‘A Bombshell on Unconscionable Conduct’ (1997) 25 ABLR 
227; R Baxt, ‘Unconscionable Conduct under Trade Practices Act ‘(1997) 71 ALJ 432; R Baxt, 
‘Unconscionability Taken One Step Too Far?’ (1997) 25 ABLR 301; Ross P Buckley, 
‘Unconscionability Amok, or Two Readily Distinguishable Cases?’ (1998) 26 ABLR 323; Ross P 
Buckley, ‘Sections 51 AA and 51 AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: The Need for Reform’ 
(2000) 8 TPLJ 5. 
145  Austin J expressly acknowledged the dangers associated with any judicial intervention with the 
performance of unconditional commercial obligations: Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] 
NSWSC 713, [94]. 
146  The colourful phrase used by Callaway JA in Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty 
Ltd [1998] VR 812, 831, as subsequently adopted as an article subtitle by The Honourable 
Justice David Byrne, ‘Rights of the Grantor under a Performance Bond’, (2001) Building and 
Construction Law 4. 
147  (1979) 141 CLR 443.  In Olex Focas, Batt J observed that the High Court in Wood Hall Ltd v 
Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443 noted with ‘apparent equanimity’ that, in making its 
demands, the beneficiary was pursuing a strategy of applying pressure on the account party with 
a view to achieving an advantageous settlement of their dispute. 
148  R Perrignon, ‘Performance Bonds and Standby letters of Credit: The Australian Experience’, 
(1991) 2 JBFLP, 157,161. 
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‘fraud exception’,149 a beneficiary’s protection will be maximised if the bank guarantee or 
unconditional performance bond operates not only as a security but also as a risk allocation 
device.150  To achieve these objectives a number of safeguards can be adopted. 
 
As regards the security instrument itself, the beneficiary should ensure that it operates as a 
primary undertaking to pay rather than as a guarantee151or a contract of surety.  The issuing 
bank’s obligation to pay should be specified in the instrument to be unconditional152 and the 
terms of the underlying contract should not be incorporated by reference.153   Beneficiaries 
should also ensure that the nominated issuing bank is unlikely to have a liquidated claim which 
may be set off as against the beneficiary.154 
 
In addition, a beneficiary should require that the underlying contract contain certain provisions.  
The account party should be required to expressly acknowledge that: 
 
• the bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond, in addition to being a security, is 
a risk allocation device, it being the intention of the parties that the risk of litigation 
(particularly who is to be out of pocket pending resolution of a dispute)155 or insolvency156 
be borne by the account party; and 
 
• the terms of the underlying contract do not (and are not intended to) contain any 
restriction upon the beneficiary’s right to make demand157 and further that the beneficiary 
is entitled to make demand under the bank guarantee or unconditional performance 
                         
149  For public policy reasons. 
150  In Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812 the Supreme Court of 
Victoria expressly recognised the potential use of these securities as risk allocation devices 
(albeit that this conclusion was reached as a matter of construction of the commercial purpose of 
the agreement).  Jones also refers to the importance that must be attached to the parties’ 
intentions concerning the allocation of risk: William Mark Jones, above n 119, 229. 
151  As previously noted, the term ‘guarantee’ is a misnomer. 
152  In order that the form of the document is seen to represent the intention of the parties: Malaysia 
Hotel (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sabemo Pty Ltd (1993) 11 BCL 50. 
153  To avoid the type of result that flowed in Barclay Mowlem Construction Co. v Simon Engineering 
(1991) 23 NSWLR 451. 
154  To avoid the consequences of the decision in Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v 
Kloeckner & Co AG [1990] 2 QB 514 (a letter of credit case that may apply by analogy). 
155  Often a key issue that would otherwise arise as a matter of construction of the underlying contract 
see, for example, Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812. 
156  In the same way (as previously noted) that a letter of credit arrangement usally operates to 
reallocate the risks of litigation, insolvency and dishonesty: M Shaw, above n 13, 253. 
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bond notwithstanding any dispute under the underlying contract158 provided that the 
demand is not fraudulent at common law.159 
 
If these suggestions were followed, the bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond 
would operate to substantially allocate the risk in the transaction to the account party.  Express 
provisions in the underlying contract would circumscribe argument based on implied 
restrictions160 and also militate against any interference with the autonomy principle based on 
statutory unconscionability.161  The inclusion of the suggested provisions in the underlying 
contract would undoubtedly strengthen the bargaining position of a beneficiary during any 
subsequent settlement negotiations,162 and allow a beneficiary to act in what may be otherwise 
interpreted as a commercially driven manner.163 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Even though bank guarantees and unconditional performance bonds may be unconditional in 
their wording, they are not necessarily as ‘good as cash’ due to the exceptions to the autonomy 
principle outlined in this paper.  Unfortunately, the true boundaries of all three exceptions have 
not been clearly delineated by the courts. 
 
The operation of the fraud exception remains clouded in mystery.  Is fraud restricted to common 
law fraud164 or, adopting a more flexible approach,165 does it extend to equitable fraud or gross 
unconscionable conduct166 or circumstances where there has been a total failure of 
consideration in the underlying contract or the underlying contract has either not been 
                                                                               
157  No implied restriction can arise if it is inconsistent with an expressly agreed allocation of risk: 
Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812, 827 (Callaway JA). 
158  Adopting the words of Murphy J, this will help prevent a situation where all the ‘legal and factual 
complexities of a … dispute would be injected into an otherwise straightforward unconditional 
undertaking’: Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443, 461. 
159  Contractual exclusion of the common law fraud exception to the autonomy principle being 
impermissible. 
160  The second exception to the autonomy principle as described in this paper. 
161  The basis for relief in Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713. 
162  A ‘strategy’ that was previously unquestioned based on the High Court decision in Wood Hall 
Limited v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443. 
163  Being one possible characterisation of the conduct of the administrative receivers in Boral 
Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713. 
164  The restrictive English approach. 
165  Consistent with the more expansive approach adopted in American and Canadian decisions. 
166  As suggested by Young J in Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Australia) Pty Ltd 
(1985) 1 NSWLR 545 
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performed or avoided?167  In addition to these unresolved fundamental theoretical questions, 
contradictory dicta in relation to the standard of proof, the inherent uncertainties usually 
associated with any application for equitable relief and differing curial approaches, in part 
reflective of the significance of the identity of the party seeking relief, combine168 to provide a 
legal landscape which is undoubtedly challenging for those who are called upon to provide 
commercial advice. 
 
The second exception, restrictions arising from the terms of the underlying contract, is no less 
problematic.  Faced with irreconcilable lines of authority,169 judicial interpretation of individual 
contractual wording has become paramount.  Unfortunately, such a demonstrably ad hoc 
approach provides little certainty for either beneficiaries or account parties. 
 
The final exception, statutory unconscionability, is also troublesome in its application.  Whilst the 
argument is undoubtedly open that a judicial characterisation of individual circumstances as 
‘sufficiently special’170 may justify interference with the autonomy principle, this approach may 
not sit comfortably with the intention that the bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond 
operate as a risk allocation device (as well as a security).  If the risk of a beneficiary acting in 
what may be characterised as a commercially driven manner is to be borne by the account party 
this will need to be made patently clear in the underlying contract. 
 
If the safeguards suggested in this paper are not routinely implemented, the intended 
beneficiary of a bank guarantee or unconditional performance bond may well rue the day that 
such an instrument was accepted in lieu of a cash retention.171 
                         
167  The suggestion made by Eveleigh J in Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman Contractors Ltd (1984) 28 
BLR 19. 
168  Part 3.2.1 of this paper. 
169  Part 4.1 of this paper. 
170  Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713, [94]. 
171  At a macro level, a wholesale return to the use of cash retentions would also reduce the funds 
available in certain industry sectors, such as the construction sector: William Mark Jones, above 
n 119, 238. 
